This article compares US and Chinese national soft power strategies, using the cases of the US Shared Values Initiative for the Middle East in the aftermath of 9-11 and the present operation of Chinese Confucius Institutes in the US. Comparing these two national programs, I describe a consistent disjunction between visual image and spoken word for each. Regardless of variations in national approaches to soft power, this disconnect between seeing and talking is a limitation of soft power as a cultural tool of diplomatic communication. First, public diplomats' unexamined folk theories about culture's instrumental role in messaging emphasize spectacle in ways inimical to reciprocal engagement. Second, as a cultural policy of display, soft power image projection discourages opportunities for inter-cultural dialogue. Third, government-sponsored national image management and branding are often controversial elsewhere, in the process touching off boundary-patrolling public debates instead of helping to build international relationships.
Introduction
In the broader project of public diplomacy, culture is often assumed to be a vehicle that facilitates processes of listening and of dialogue among different publics and across national boundaries. Typical of this is the well-known story of how a Dave Brubeck concert engineered a successful 1988 US-Soviet nuclear arms reduction treaty by getting people talking again, in this case about jazz, after negotiations had stalled at a Moscow summit (Schudel 2008) . The mandate and cultural programs of organizations like the US Information Agency, charged with 'telling America's story' to the world, best typify this set of ideas (see Arndt 2007) . The USIA was, of course, shuttered in 1999. But pervasive largely unexamined assumptions about the efficacy of culture for diplomacy, particularly when presented as performance and spectacle, still linger. This is not just the case for the US, but for other national efforts of soft power projection. 1 In the context of the US's 'Asia pivot', countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region are reassessing their diplomatic footprints, given the need to navigate new realities of foreign policy amid the potential emergence of a full-blown regional rivalry between the US and China (see Perlez 2014) . This is a contest on multiple fronts. But the increasing visibility of Chinese soft power, along with renewed US efforts to project its own soft power in the region, have made cultural diplomacy one of these fronts (see Nash 2014) . However, while the term -'soft power' -enjoys wide international circulation and is now routinely used as part of domestic discussions about national cultural projection in such countries as China, India, Brazil, Iran, and elsewhere, as Isar (2013) has noted, it is also an increasingly 'polysemic term' reflecting an extensive 'range of representational purposes and assumptions'. In other words, it is an error to assume that international efforts of soft power projection are up to the same things. A growing corpus of comparative research has begun to explore and to highlight the differences among national soft power strategies (see Hayden 2012, Nye and Sun 2014) .
US and Chinese soft power both instrumentalize culture, but not in the same ways. However, as I argue here, more fundamentally every national soft power approach largely adopts a comparably uncritical orientation to cultural spectacle in diplomacy that tends to produce the same effect: a division between image and spoken word that undermines sustained dialogue. In what follows I focus upon US and Chinese practices of soft power, with particular attention to how each understands the relationship of culture to diplomacy. I examine the responses of the ostensible 'target audiences' of two soft power efforts, the US Shared Values Initiative after 9-11 and the increase of Chinese Confucius Institutes (CI's) in the US and elsewhere, as a means to investigate both efforts of messaging through culture, where the 'representational' purpose of spectacle works to undermine the often touted goal of inter-cultural dialogue. One effect of the tendency of soft power programs to introduce fault lines between international image projection and dialogue has been to reinforce frontiers between these different national conversations about culture. In fact, China's soft power efforts in the US have aggravated the possibilities for more constructive dialogue between the two. If culture has become an explicit subject of political and policy discourse for both China and the US, so far these are largely non-overlapping conversations.
Diplomacy and spectacle
Between 2009 and 2011, I administered a cultural diplomacy survey, 2 which was designed to provide an opportunity for respondents -both active and retired public diplomacy officers in the US -to articulate their own understandings of how cultural diplomacy works. In other words, how do those professionally engaged in such work define to themselves successful outcomes for what they do? The survey also elicited diplomats' beliefs about how culture works as a vehicle of communication in diplomacy. Here I summarize key features of a working theory, operative among Foreign Service professionals, that emerged in survey responses and which addresses culture's diplomatic efficacy as an instrumental means to advance mutual understanding in international affairs.
In addition to a notable lack of consensus among cultural diplomacy practitioners about the meaning of 'culture' itself, 3 respondents consistently advanced a theory that I will identify, borrowing from McGuigan (2004, pp. 61-64) , with a 'cultural policy of display', where it is assumed that the state is not simply the main sanction for political power but also the primary source for the display of national culture. 4 In this mode, governments promote spectacles of nationhood as forms of national aggrandizement. Of particular interest for present purposes is the regular connection drawn by respondents between a cultural policy of display -of showing or representing the nation through cultural spectacle -and the efficacy assumed for culture itself. Here I point to some of the unanticipated consequences of this preference for the performative and visual goals of representation among cultural diplomats.
Respondents consistently equated the concept of culture with the task of representation. They defined 'cultures', for example, as the ways different peoples 'express themselves'. Again, culture is the 'presentation' of 'a society's thoughts and values'. Or, a culture is a community's 'outlook'. The arts are 'expressions of American society'. As was noted, cultural diplomacy is 'the efforts nations make to portray their societies and values'. It is a case of the 'projection' of culture abroad. Likewise, 'The best way to explain our culture is by putting it on display'. Cultural diplomacy is effective when using 'the most visible forms of outreach to large audiences'. Or, similarly, cultural diplomacy is a case of 'explaining' by 'demonstrating'. It is effective when it helps people elsewhere 'gain a firsthand view' or a 'more accurate picture' of American culture. A majority of respondents described communicational success through cultural diplomacy as analogous to effective visual representation -as being able to pull off a 'show'.
Survey respondents, in short, advanced the concept that for diplomacy cultures are self-evidently national cultures. In keeping with the history and practice of US cultural diplomacy, respondents also equated cultural performance with acts of expression primarily understood as representation (usually of 'American society' or desirable American values like 'freedom of expression'). In so doing they took for granted that: cultural expressions correspond to cultural values; they are self-evident, portable, and contextless; and they further assumed that these expressions are unproblematic and effective vehicles for national values when incorporated into acts of exchange and performance in staged cultural events. Cultural values -discussed as transparently expressed through diverse cultural vehicles of performance like the arts -were understood to be relatively straightforwardly extractable and easily accessible to international audiences. Practitioners appeared to accept that cultural spectacle amounted to an effective representational strategy and worked as diplomatic communication.
When prompted to offer examples of such activities of cultural diplomacy, respondents favoured activities conducive to spectacle, most frequently listing exhibitions, motion pictures, radio programs, TV broadcasts, the digital arts, music, dance, or theater, the plastic and visual arts, and related activities. This should not be surprising, since such activities have been a staple of US cultural diplomacy programming for some time. Arndt (2007, p. 412) has offered vivid details about the work carried out by the cultural offices of U.S. embassies during the Cold War, which was 'to publicize, present, and stage events'. Arndt characterizes the diplomatic efforts to 'internationalize America's arts' as a case of 'the US export of performances', which, it was hoped, were a 'highly visible' means to expose international audiences to, in Arndt's words, the 'sounds and sights of democracy'.
This set of assumptions remains widespread. As stated in the first sentence of the first page of an influential State Department report on public diplomacy (2005, p. 1), 'It is in cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented'. This sentence has since reappeared verbatim in multiple reports and discussions, such as the 2010 report of the US Center for Citizen Diplomacy's International Cultural Engagement Task Force. 'Share America', a new website launched by the US Department of State, also appears to assume this representational transparency as a prerequisite for the extractability of political values from cultural images. The website offers 'compelling stories and images that spark discussion and debate on important topics like democracy, freedom of expression, innovation, entrepreneurship, education, and the role of civil society'.
5 Others describe it as providing 'bitesized nuggets of video, photos, and text' (Scola 2014) , to be fed into Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and comparable social media platforms. Beyond content sharing, how these discussions will be 'sparked' is not clear.
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The elision by respondents of acts of cultural spectacle with acts of representation is reminiscent of Langer's (1942) idea of 'presentational symbols'. She describes these as conveying otherwise abstract 'ideas' because they correspond in form or by analogy to that which is symbolized, as a 'projection' of it. Presentational symbols function independently and they work all at once like a 'picture'. Langer's conception reflects a long-standing philosophical commitment to the socalled correspondence theory of truth, an influential set of assumptions historically ubiquitous across post-Enlightenment European and US interpretations of art and culture. As Harris (2010, p. 69) has put it when talking about the 'great debate' in art, 'At the heart of that tradition is the unspoken premise that depiction is another form of naming'. For example, with his well-known distinction between what can be shown and what can be said, Wittgenstein divided the possibilities for expression in ways comparable to the disjunctions between the image and the spoken word taken-for-granted by US public diplomacy practitioners described here. This legacy continues to shape public conceptions of the expressive possibilities of culture and art. But as Rorty (1989) has shown, a representational theory where knowledge is understood to be acquired through a process of 'mirroring', mistakenly assumes meaning is like a picture that faithfully 'represents'. Rorty argues that we are better off treating this representational theory as our own folk theory.
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that cultural diplomacy as a display directed at a public is not the best route to intercultural dialogue. The effort to perform, express, and project, might succeed in conjuring an audience among international publics, but in so doing this can also build barriers to conversation, which I explore here. An audience member watches the show but is seldom an active participant in it.
7 Audience members typically occupy a different world from that of the players. The representational assumptions of diplomacy can inhibit dialogue, in other words, when publics are recruited as audiences for cultural spectacles. If meaningful reciprocal dialogue is a goal of public diplomacy, 'to think of language as a picture of the world' in Rorty's words (1989, p. 295 ) -to displace opportunities for talk with cultural representations of nations -makes conversation more of a challenge.
The US soft power conversation Joseph Nye's concept of 'soft power' has, over the years, been the subject of substantial critique and debate, with Nye regularly defending and refining the term's scope (see Nye 1990 Nye , 2011 Nye , 2014 , and Ang, Isar and Mar's introduction to this issue). I will not revisit these discussions here. But, I will briefly place the term in the context of a particular US account of economic and cultural globalization, as this was assumed to operate, primarily among US policy makers in the post-Cold War era. In other words, while Nye has tended to discuss soft power in descriptive terms and as an analytic concept, I suggest it makes more sense to treat the term as a key feature of a largely normative and policy discourse that illustrates an American-centric conception of international affairs, one that in the present era is increasingly contested by competing national approaches to soft power.
Nye has been clear that soft power springs not from states but 'largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society' (Nye 2013) . If, for Nye, soft power inheres largely in the intangible resources of 'cultural and ideological attraction', American popular culture takes the form of 'products and communication', which, in turn, are effective when they 'embody liberal, free-market principles that coincide with US society' (Nye 1990, pp. 168-169) . But such an unproblematic understanding of how the liberal values of the free market might come to inhere in cultural products disregards the process by which meanings or values come to be associated with cultural expressions. In this disregard it is reminiscent of the formulation of cultural efficacy offered by the cultural diplomats I surveyed.
In a book with the subtitle 'how globalization is changing the world's cultures', the economist Tyler Cowen (2002) offered an account of cultural goods and services in the global marketplace, which we can also view as an elaboration of Nye's soft power concept with an eye to policy makers.
8 For Cowen, cultural creativity and diversity -as represented by US culture industries like Hollywood -are subject to a Schumpeterian process of 'creative destruction' in ways enhancing the global consumer's 'menu of choice' (Cowen 2002, p. 12) , but also closely echoing current prevailing discourse among US Silicon Valley tech and information companies.
9 For Cowen, freedom -what he calls 'positive liberties' -is equated with consumer choice. His market-centric account of cultural soft power as global trade reads like a policy blueprint for the immediate post-Cold War era of US global dominance.
My interest in these ideas is not to evaluate whether they are a descriptively accurate account of the subsequent unfolding of the relationship of culture to economic globalization. Rather, I am more interested in the ways that this concatenation of ideas about the work of culture, has acquired in Hayden's words a 'compelling justificatory logic ' (2012, p. 2) in US foreign policy circles. Nye has often been at pains to clarify that soft power effectively operates outside of government. Yet, over the previous decade, US foreign policy figures have often articulated instrumental purposes for cultural content using a soft power discourse.
10
This discourse, therefore, has become one important dimension of the intersection of culture with international affairs in US policy. It expresses a conversation among US government decision-makers about the role of culture in global debate, with culture viewed as an instrument to recruit foreign publics to stated US values of liberty and choice in largely commodified form, through the free market, and outside of government.
US infomercials and nation branding
An inauspicious example of US government efforts to implement a soft power strategy is the short-lived Shared Values Initiative. Launched in 2002 in the immediate aftermath of 9-11, it was discontinued after less than a month.
11 The campaign was the brain-child of Charlotte Beers, a Madison Avenue executive and the first woman to appear on the cover of Fortune magazine, former CEO of Ogilvy & Mather (a Manhattan-based international advertising, public relations, and marketing firm), and the first US Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy after 9-11. A pioneer of branding strategies, her goal was to communicate the intangible assets of the US to a skeptical Muslim audience in the Middle East. To do this, she relied upon a mass media-based business approach to marketing using the language of 'corporate strategizing' (Plaisance 2005, p. 257) . As Snow (2003, pp. 84-85) has put it, Beers thought making a 'convincing pitch for Uncle Sam' was a question of marketing American values through smart 'brand stewardship'.
Explaining her strategy to more effectively combat, in her words, 'the outrageous myths and lies' about Muslim persecution in the US circulating in the Middle East, Beers (2002) put it this way, 'We needed pictures, not words'. Soon a new State Department website documented 'Muslim Life in America' with pictures of mosques and of smiling American Muslim families. This was complemented by the production of a series of videos in the style of infomercials that featured American Muslims from different walks of life, including a Libyan-born baker, a hijab-wearing school-teacher, a Brooklyn-born paramedic, as well as an Algerianborn director of the National Institutes of Health. All discuss their lives in America, emphasizing such US values as egalitarianism, religious pluralism and freedom. The videos were produced by McCann-Erickson -the advertising firm responsible for the Rice-a-Roni jingle and the 'Army Strong' campaign for the US Army -and were dismissed in the NY Times (Perlez 2002) as 'Muslim-as-apple-pie videos'.
The campaign proved a spectacular failure. It met almost immediate opposition from governments in the Middle East, with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan refusing to air the videos. As Olins (2007, p. 178) notes, 'The focus of a national branding programme is usually a visual symbol'. And Beers' campaign relied on specific imagery of all-American Muslims in their suburban kitchens and at baseball games. People spoke, but their voices were enlisted for the instrumental purpose of 'representation', and the broadcasted videos exercised an 'antidialogic' effect (Rampton and Stauber 2003, Plaisance 2005, pp. 251, 258) . As Snow (2003, pp. 97, 105) emphasizes, the audience was encouraged to view Americans 'predominantly as a product'. While this might indeed be how marketing firms approach the domestic US market, Snow is also clear that the campaign's designers fundamentally misunderstood their 'target audience'.
For critics at home and abroad the fundamental problem with the Shared Values Initiative was that it sought to answer a question that had not been asked: whether Muslims in the US were discriminated against; while, as Rampton and Stauber (2003) assert, it failed to take up the issues at the core of Muslim resentment of the US: its policies in the Middle East, particularly regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, and military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was compounded by a corporate branding strategy that discouraged mutual engagement through dialogue, and that pursued national policy goals by putting US government messages 'in someone else's mouth'. As Rampton (2007) suggests, rather than facilitating engagement with people in the Middle East on their own terms, the Shared Values campaign was more revealing of 'how the propagandists see themselves'. This campaign failed because it illustrated a largely US conversation and set of expectations about diversity and citizenship, in the process unintentionally highlighting the parochial specificity of this conversation to the exclusion of more open-ended discussion and debate with counterparts in the Middle East about the US's role in the region.
As a normative rather than descriptive account of global US policy goals for 'culture', Nye's concept of soft power has become a part of the lexicon of US government engagement with the world. But when the US government seeks to instrumentalize its soft power resources, the limits of this strategy are often made apparent and, in fact, can themselves become a source of friction. Singh (2010) has pointed to the regular anxiety provoked by the global circulation of the cultural content of entertainment industries like film and TV, perceived to undermine the cultural sources of national identity. And Bayles (2014) has suggested that allowing the entertainment sector to assume the job of communicating the US's image to the world has been disastrous, since such cultural content is too often violent, sexualized, anti-religious, politically cynical, and celebrates rootless individual freedoms outside of any social or collective context. All of this contributes to a lack of meaningful dialogue with counterparts who quite often speak from within social worlds variously defined in collective or religious terms.
Part of the problem is the limiting of soft power to a US-specific account of culture as globally circulating and competitively branded goods and services, which are routinely if abstractly elided with freedom of choice. Use of commercial branding encourages the idea that all national cultures fit into a US vision of neoliberal globalization, where the elision of cultural policy with marketing plays up zerosum competitive national points-of-difference even as it flattens out the plurality of voices constitutive of the nation and its critics (see Aronczyk 2014) . The overly simplistic equation of cultural content with American values that target audiences are expected to extract, discourages mutual engagement. Policy commentary on the efficacy of commodified popular culture expresses a US-specific lexicon of personal freedoms exercised as consumer choices in ways that often fail to engage with the perspectives or grievances of foreign publics, particularly with respect to different expectations about the role of culture in public life. The Shared Values Initiative illustrates a US version of the disjunction between spectacle and dialogue that government-sponsored soft power programming can introduce.
Soft power for the Middle Kingdom
Culture has become a linchpin of Chinese soft power only recently. During the Cold War era, for the most part, for official Communist China 'culture' referred to the backward-looking 'traditional culture' from which the country needed to liberate itself in order to embrace Mao's version of Marxism. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, Mao famously denounced 'Confucian dogs' (Li 2005) . However, beginning in the 1980s, the debate over Asian values in the human rights context heated up, which gradually put cultural questions back on the Chinese government's agenda (see Bauer and Bell 1999) . While the US often assailed China in particular in human rights terms, China and other East Asian countries rejected the universality of the US account of human rights. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew (1994, pp. 111, 114) , the early face of this regional movement, sharply contrasted 'the expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave' in the US with the 'filial piety' characteristic of Asian countries and conducive to well-ordered societies. China quickly followed Lee Kuan Yew's lead, also adopting an 'Asian values' position that prioritized collective cultural rights within a national framework, in contrast to a US tendency to champion universal individual civil and political rights.
A notable dimension of this about face has been the 'rehabilitation' of Confucianism -along with other classical Chinese philosophical traditions -from its pariah status during the Mao era. Among China's leadership Confucianism, emphasizing society's collective interests over those of the market or individual, is now considered representative of Chinese traditional culture and critical for 'understanding the national characteristics of the Chinese' (Gardels 2014) . Beginning in the early 2000s, soft power has also become an increasingly frequent term of reference in China (see Mingjiang 2008, Li and Chen 2011) , with culture recognized by China's leadership as 'the core resource of a state's power' (Glaser and Murphy 2009, p. 10) , and with Confucianism as the most important source of 'traditional Chinese virtues' (see also the treatment of Chinese media diplomacy in this issue).
In his address to the 17th national congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2007, then party general secretary Hu Jintao promoted the doctrine of a 'socialist harmonious society', and stressed the need to enhance Chinese cultural 'soft power' in order to build 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' (Jintao 2012) . Discussion of soft power in China has similarly focused on effectively adapting the concept 'with Chinese characteristics'. Notably, in contrast to use of this term in the US, in China soft power encompasses both domestic and international purposes (Mingjiang 2008) . On the one hand, culture is extolled as an important source of national cohesion with soft power a matter of 'cultural security' (Keane 2010) ; on the other, it is a privileged means to project a positive image of China for international audiences (see Jintao 2012 , Xiaoling 2012 , Gardels 2014 .
In contrast to a US conception of soft power, which emphasizes the global circulation of contemporary popular cultural goods and services, for China's leadership and among a majority of Chinese scholars, 'China's ancient history and traditional culture' are viewed as a 'valuable source of soft power'. In this sense, concepts of 'harmony' articulated in and allied with Confucian thinking have been repackaged by the CPC (Angang 2006) , and represented in notions of 'harmonious society', 'harmonious co-existence', or the 'harmonious world' concept, initially offered by Hu Jintao at the Asia-Africa summit in 2005 (Glaser and Murphy 2009, pp. 13-14) . This approach is at least in part calculated to combat the 'China threat' thesis of a potentially destabilizing new global power. But, again, in contrast to use of the concept -soft power -in the US to indicate the suasive possibilities of culture in international affairs, for China's leadership 'soft power' (or, ruan shili) is directly identified with traditional national cultural values, 12 with the concept of 'harmony' an expression of and a key for Chinese hearts and minds (see also Hayden 2012, p. 179) .
Most recently, China's president Xi Jinping has set a more combative tone, at once promoting the virtues of China's Confucian-based national culture and international goals of 'harmonious co-existence' while criticizing overtly Western cultural expressions among Chinese artists and cultural producers, including 'unrestrained extreme individualism', material pursuits, and the vulgarity of commercial success (see Gardels 2014 , Thiruchelvam 2014 . Most recently, China's education minister criticized the use of textbooks in college classrooms that promote 'Western values' (see Buckley 2015) . If China continues frequently to discuss its soft power, in large part this is less a conversation about an international audience and more often a domestic debate about China's national cultural identity and its relationship to the ongoing rule of the CPC (see Zhang and Li 2010) , where 'soft power' is a way of talking about principles of traditional Chinese culture.
At the same time US and Chinese conceptions of their own soft power appear, often purposefully, to be almost diametrically opposed. The US policy conversation revolves around contemporary popular culture, the global circulation of cultural goods and services, personal freedoms, and consumer choice. While in China soft power is most often embodied in classical or traditional cultural values, concerned with domestic cultural cohesion, and pitched as a goal of domestic and international harmony, in explicit contrast to vilified individualisms and market excesses of various sorts. In other words, when articulated in the register of soft power, the very meaning of culture in international affairs begins to look a lot like a zero-sum normative contest, in this case between the US and China. This has become apparent in recent controversies around the increase of CI's in the US, a case to which I now turn.
China's soft power and CI's Over the last decade China has also ramped up its own soft power projection. China's program of CI's, founded in 2004, promotes the study of Chinese language and culture and sponsors Chinese cultural events. Globally there are upwards of 475 CI's and 851 classrooms in 126 countries, which serve over 3,450,000 students, according to the numbers offered at last December's 9th Confucius Institute Conference in Xiamen, China. 13 The program has publicized a goal of 1000 CI's worldwide by 2020 (ICEF Monitor 2014). Western liberal democracies have the highest concentration of CI's (Wang 2014, p. 9) , with almost 100 in the US alone. On average, we are told, a new Institute is set up somewhere in the world every six days (Ruan 2014) . They have become a major expression of China's global soft power aspirations and an important strategic part of Chinese global and political competition with 'the West' (see Sahlins 2013 Sahlins , 2015 .
CI's are hosted by in-country academic institutions, but the CI program is managed by a branch of the Chinese government, Hanban, which is associated with the Ministry of Education. CI's are intended to create 'an improved global image' for China (Hubbert 2014a, p. 34) , and China's propaganda chief, Li Changchun, has described them as 'an important part of China's overseas propaganda setup' (quoted in Redden 2012) . In addition to language study, they seek to increase the attractiveness of Chinese culture by foregrounding cultural accomplishments in classical poetry or art and engaging in frequent public programming and outreach, sponsoring extracurricular activities such as Chinese films, art exhibitions, stage presentations, cultural performances, trips to museums, celebrations of festivals like the Chinese New Year, student summer camps in China, and even dance and cooking classes.
In her ethnographic study of CI's, anthropologist Jennifer Hubbert has described the activities sponsored by CI's as designed to achieve two soft power-inspired policy goals of China's government. They encourage alignments of 'witness' to the tangible results of China's spectacular rise. They also represent China in terms of an 'exceptionalist narrative of modernity' that locates Chinese culture in an 'essentialized and exoticized but depoliticized and palatable past' (Hubbert 2014b, pp. 34-35, p. 39, p. 41) , for example, highlighting the Chinese opera or the terracotta warriors of Xi'an as opposed to the country's more controversial present. The image making activities of CI's work to divorce 'Chinese culture' from the sometimes fraught contexts of China's current great power aspirations and the country's often contentious role in the global economy and in world politics. This approach has been derided by critics, who have described the cultural offerings of CI's as a quaint and packaged form of 'culturetainment' (Redden 2012) , with CI faculty turned into 'entertainment specialists' for an agency of the Chinese government. At the same time, the attention to 'pandas and chopsticks' has been interpreted as displacing discussion of the current Chinese state as a 'repressive regime' (Redden 2014a) . When understood as a 'one-stop China shop' (Redden 2012) , critics have suggested, Institutes can routinely deflect attention from more controversial and politically sensitive topics such as human rights violations, Tibet, Tiananmen Square, Falun Gong, or the recent Hong Kong protests (see Norrie 2011 , Sahlins 2013 , Redden 2014a ).
Hubbert takes this further, showing how the invitation to witness cultural spectacle is met with skepticism. Participants in Confucius Institute-sponsored programs often equate efforts to manage China's image and the absence of classroom discussion of topics considered sensitive in China with acts of censorship and 'totalitarian control' (Hubbert 2014a (Hubbert , 2014c , which were in turn taken to be signs of a more 'authentic China'. The particular cultural policy of display and witness practiced by CI's, in other words, is perceived by their 'Western' targets to be in direct tension with more grounded and realistic discussions of China's current role in the world. This suggests the relative ineffectiveness of CI's as instruments of soft power. And, just as with the case of the US's Shared Values Initiative, one source of this ineffectiveness appears to be the disjunction between showing and talking, or spectacle and dialogue, characteristic of state-sponsored soft power efforts.
US debates about Chinese soft power
Particularly in the US, Europe, and Australia, CI's have been popular but also controversial. On the one hand, CI's bring significant economic and human resources to already taxed US public school and university campuses. They have been welcomed by school administrators seeking to offset diminishing public funding and sometimes drastic budget cuts (especially in such areas as foreign language study), and as a part of sound financial planning in the context of higher education's market-driven transformation over the past quarter century (e.g. Redden 2012 , Marcus 2013 , Hubbert 2014a . In the context of China's emergence as a global power, CI's have also been treated as a welcome resource for US and other students who will need to know more about China in the near future if corporations from these countries, in particular, are to remain globally competitive (see Hubbert 2014c , McCord 2014 .
On the other hand, as Nye (2013) has suggested about CI's, at least so far 'China has earned a limited return on its investment'. They have been the subject of controversy on multiple university campuses in the US and elsewhere. In 2013 the University of McMaster in Canada terminated its relationship with Hanban after an instructor complained of having to conceal her affiliation with Falun Gong, a spiritual practice outlawed in China (Cai 2014b) . In Australia, Sydney University was criticized when its Institute hosted a Chinese Tibetologist critical of the Dalai Lama in 2012, initially called off a scheduled talk by the Dalai Lama in 2013, and then attempted to restrict news coverage, external marketing and use of the university's logo for the event (Lau 2013 ). And at a meeting of European sinologists in 2014, the Chinese director general of the Confucius Institute program ignited controversy by removing information about a Taiwanese organization from official conference materials (Cai 2014a). 14 In the last few years, the climate of reception for CI's has become less welcoming. In Canada both the universities of Manitoba and British Columbia turned down proposals for CI's on their campuses, while in the US University of Pennsylvania faculty were successful in doing the same. In addition, organized faculty objections preceded the eventual establishment of Institutes at the universities of Chicago, Stockholm, and Melbourne respectively (Marcus 2013) . Following its Canadian counterpart, the American Association of University Professors (2014) issued a report this past June identifying the CI program as an 'arm of the Chinese state' advancing a 'state agenda' in ways inconsistent with 'academic freedom'. This was followed by the University of Chicago and Penn State University opting to close their CI's this fall (Redden 2014b (Redden , 2014c , with each citing comparable concerns. Most recently the US House Foreign Affairs Committee organized a public hearing in December of 2014 to examine the perception of the growing influence of CI's in US higher education, including the outsourcing of academic control, self-censorship, compromising of free speech, and the status of liberal ideals on college campuses. In this hearing, a US congressional representative described American universities as 'islands of freedom' for foreign students, and the committee recommend that the US Government Accountability Office review all academic partnerships with China (Fischer 2014 , Mulhere 2014 .
Particularly since CI's are embedded in host universities, in the context of growing controversy about them, critics in the US, Europe, Canada, and Australia have raised their concerns primarily in the terms of academic freedom. These include: a lack of transparency, the possibility of restrictions upon free speech and open debate, the potential for self-censorship, the compromising of institutional autonomy, and the potential role of CI's in propagating state-sponsored propaganda. These are important issues. But, notably, as expressed they are not really 'in dialogue' with Chinese counterparts. These are, rather, recapitulations of arguments that are particularly characteristic of higher education in the US and elsewhere in the 'West', and part of the broader discourse and focus on liberties informing US policy conversations about Nye's conception of soft power, as discussed previously.
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The chair of the AAUP report committee pointedly emphasized that CI's are incompatible with 'American standards of academic freedom' (emphasis mine; quoted in Redden 2014a). Meanwhile, human rights observers concerned about CI's have emphasized the role of universities in the US to be one of upholding 'Western ideals of free speech' (emphasis mine; Hansen 2014). Sahlins (emphasis mine; 2015, p. 5) explains the source of his objections to the growth of CI's in US colleges and universities, noting that, in the absence of more critical engagement among China scholars, 'Regrettably, it becomes necessary for people like me to take up these essentially domestic, US issues of academic integrity'. If these are basic values that underpin the purpose and development of US higher education, for the objectives of cultural diplomacy, they are inward-looking concerns that do not engage, say, higher education in China. They function to reinforce already frequently discussed and widely shared core values of US higher education.
In other words, instead of promoting intercultural dialogue, China's soft power strategy appears primarily to have provoked boundary-patrolling behaviour in the US public sphere. Hubbert (2014a, p. 42) similarly concludes that US participants in CI's perceive the Chinese language as a potential mechanism for their own 'empowerment in the U.S. context'. In a comparable argument, Clarke (2014) has called for more attention to the reception of cultural diplomacy programs among target audiences, emphasizing the ways cultural products are used to address meaningful concerns around self-identity. US and Chinese soft power programs have not, in short, led to a shared dialogue.
Conclusion: dialogic prospects
The effectiveness of Chinese or US soft power projection is, at best, an open question. Both the Shared Values Initiative and CI's inadvertently fueled controversy and debate in the Middle East and in the US respectively. As I have emphasized, part of the reason for this is a prevalent set of beliefs among public diplomacy professionals, apparent in responses to my cultural diplomacy survey, and which we can think of as a folk theory they maintain regarding the role of culture. This folk theory, which I have called a cultural policy of display, privileges cultural spectacle in diplomacy as an effective vehicle of communication, and takes for granted that spectacle offers the unmediated cultural representation of national values in other national contexts.
As I have developed the argument here, as a folk theory this set of ideas promotes soft power-type strategies of image projection that often undermine intercultural dialogue while promoting boundary-patrolling discourse that serves more to re-entrench national differences than to cross them. In large part this is because the folk theory of representation in diplomacy disincentivizes talk in favour of image making. For the US, at least, the government's Shared Values Initiative and public reception of increasingly numerous CI's have served to highlight largely coextensive and parochially narrow national conversations or debates that have further elaborated or re-inscribed bright lines around specifically American perspectives and preoccupations while not, in general, opening up a wider international conversation.
But there are alternatives to this approach. One is to consider the diplomatic potential of proliferating US-China transnational and collaborative advocacy networks. These networks can be found across a broad range of initiatives, often involving academic institutions and think tanks in the US. While space does not allow a fuller discussion of these here, some notable networks specifically concerned with culture include: the ongoing collaboration between the Getty Conservation Institute and China's State Administration for Cultural Heritage, which resulted in the bilingual 'China Principles' for heritage conservation 16 ; and the China-US Folklore and Intangible Cultural Heritage Project, 17 an ongoing collaboration between US-based folklorists and their Chinese counterparts contributing to the further internationalization of folklore studies.
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Such a focus on professional arts and culture networks between the US and China builds on Keck and Sikkink's (1998) pioneering analysis of the work of framing accomplished by 'transnational advocacy networks' in human rights fields. It also extends Cross's (2013) recent study of the 'knowledge-based transnational networks' behind the governance framework for European integration, and the 'epistemic communities' they form. All three cases suggest the advantages of focusing attention on what circulates through networks, and the ways this can generate shared frames rather than agonistic arguments.
The activities of transnational applied humanities networks offer a different approach than that of the cultural policy of display: the advantages of working through collaboration by ceding authority and promoting the agency of others in the co-production of shared knowledge. Instead of government-sponsored programs pitched at the global or international level focused on competitive values-based message delivery, these proliferating collaborative networks tend to be issue-specific and they build directly on already shared often professional commitments as a way to break new ground (as also argued in the article by Isar in this issue).
Such a collaborative approach is more dialogic in orientation. These cases of networked collaboration do not simply assume soft power message delivery through the alchemy of image projection. Nor do they take for granted the unmediated and unidirectional representation of national values through cultural spectacle. Instead, shared frames about the relation of culture to policy become subjects of mutual attention and dialogue and emergent outcomes of these collaborative networks. Building on expressed commitments already shared by counterparts, such applied humanities networks hold out the possibility of effectively enlarging a shared conversation around culture in international affairs.
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